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State Enforcement in a Polycentric World 
David A. Hyman, William E. Kovacic* 
If you tell the Army “Secure that building!” They will 
surround it with armor and heavy infantry and not let 
anyone out of it until told to[.] If you tell the Marines 
“Secure that building!” They will storm the building, 
eliminate any resistance, and allow no one to enter it until 
told to. If you tell the Navy “Secure that building!” They 
will turn out the lights, close and lock all doors and 
windows and post a fire watch. If you tell the Air Force 
“Secure that building!” They will take out a 30-year lease 
with an option to buy.1 
 —Anonymous Reddit Post 
It was the late 1950s and General Curtis LeMay was the 
Chief of Staff of the Air Force. The Air Force and the Navy 
at that time were vying for who would have the primary 
mission of the strategic defense of the country. The Air 
Force was advocating its land based strategic bombers and 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Navy was 
advocating its ballistic missile submarines and putting 
nuclear capable aircraft aboard aircraft carriers. The 
debate was heated and there was not enough money to do 
both. The future missions of both services were at stake. 
An Air Force Colonel was briefing General LeMay on the 
Soviet threat versus the strategic requirements funded in 
the budget. The Colonel told General LeMay that the 
Russians, our enemy, were capable of . . . and at that point 
General LeMay stopped him. LeMay was quoted 
 
*   Hyman is Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Kovacic is Global 
Competition Professor of Law and Policy, George Washington University School of Law, 
and a Non-Executive Director of the United Kingdom’s Competition and Markets Authority. 
The views expressed here are the authors’ alone. 
 1. The Differences Between the Branches of the US Military, REDDIT (Mar. 2, 2018), 
https://www.reddit.com/r/Jokes/comments/81n73v/the_differences_between_the_bran
ches_of_the_us/. 
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as saying, “The Russians are our adversary. The Navy is 
our enemy.”2 
—John Melchner 
“State Enforcement in an Interstate World” is an important topic—
fully deserving of all the attention it has received. Past commentators on 
this topic have generally treated the federal government as a unitary 
entity. Building on prior work on the subject, this Article explores the 
polycentric nature of federal regulatory authority and shows how 
cooperation and rivalry have long been dominant realities of the modern 
administrative state. The Article discusses how these dynamics complicate 
analysis of state enforcement in an interstate world and identifies 
strategies for reducing the frequency and magnitude of the seemingly 
inevitable conflicts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For legal academics, there is no shortage of policy perennials 
and federalism is always near or at the top of that list. Debates over 
 
 2. John Melchner, Managing the Budget Process, 1998 J. PUB. INQUIRY 11, 13, 
https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/jpifw98.pdf. 
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the proper allocation of regulatory authority in a federalist system 
and the role of state enforcement in an interstate world have waxed 
and waned in intensity, but they have never been non-issues.3 
Careers have been made and tenure has been granted for 
participating in these debates.4 
Those involved in these debates have generally treated both 
federal and state authority as unitary entities, although recent 
scholarship has recognized the possibility of plural interests within 
an individual state—such as when the AG is from one political 
party, and the governor is from another political party.5 Less 
attention has been paid to the ways in which regulatory and 
enforcement authority is also divided and shared within and across 
agencies within the federal government and how that polycentric 
reality might (or should) affect the federalism debate. 
In theory, each of the entities with regulatory authority could 
“mind their own business”—minimizing the possibility of friction, 
conflict, and inconsistency. Alternatively, each of the entities with 
regulatory authority could “play nice,” by coordinating their 
activities to minimize the possibility of such problems. Although 
federal agencies often manage to either “mind their own business” 
or “play nice,” there are also reasonably frequent circumstances 
when they do neither. Drawing from examples across the 
administrative state, this Article shows how fragmentation of regu-
latory and enforcement authority within the federal administrative 
 
 3. The intensity of these debates has boomed after major shifts in the division of 
authority and/or the perception that such shifts were necessary (i.e., the New Deal, World 
War II, and the Civil Rights movement). There have also been less impressive boomlets after 
more minor adjustments (i.e., New Federalism, Obamacare, and decisions by the Supreme 
Court involving dual sovereignty). 
 4. We are not aware of a prize for coming up with the cutest name for the various 
theories of federalism, but that has not deterred participants in these debates from doing 
their utmost to come up with cute names, including “Marble Cake Federalism,” “Layer Cake 
Federalism,” and “Picket Fence Federalism.” Less cute names include “Our Federalism,” 
“Progressive Federalism,” “New Federalism,” “Dual Federalism,” “Cooperative 
Federalism,” “Fiscal Federalism,” and “Creative Federalism.” Federalism debates appear to 
attract frustrated taxonomists. 
 5. Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?, 70 STAN. 
L. REV. 1689, 1754–55 (2018); Bridget A. Fahey, Health Care Exchanges and the Disaggregation of 
States in the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 56 (2015), 
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Fahey_PDF_zhtyvuqa.pdf. 
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state has resulted in both cooperation and conflict.6 These dynamics 
of polycentric federal regulatory authority further complicates the 
problem of state enforcement in an interstate world, rendering it 
into an even more “wicked” problem than would otherwise be the 
case.7 
II. FEDERAL POWER: THE POLY-CENTRIC REALITY 
We begin with three brief case studies, drawn from competition 
law, privacy, and the humble (but tasty) salmon. 
A. Competition Law 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) have long shared regulatory authority over certain 
aspects of competition law. During the 1920s, there were cases 
where both agencies opened files to deal with the same conduct. 
For obvious reasons, this dynamic created repeated conflicts—so 
the agencies devised informal methods of consultation to avoid 
duplicative parallel inquiries. This “good fences make good 
neighbors” approach resulted in a written liaison arrangement 
(commonly called “clearance”) which allowed the agencies to avoid 
conflicts in the exercise of their concurrent regulatory power.8 A 
2002 press release describes the clearance process, as well as some 
of the challenges that deregulation and technological chance posed 
to the smooth functioning of that process: 
The FTC/DOJ clearance process was formally established in 1948; 
refinements were implemented in 1963, 1993, and 1995. The 
 
 6. Even when agencies have chosen to avoid conflicts by focusing on their own policy 
duties—i.e., they have chosen to “stay in their own lanes”—there are instances in which new 
policy issues arise and do not fit clearly within the mandate of any existing agency. The 
modern policy domain of privacy emerged from the 1960s onward as a distinct, largely novel 
area of concern. See David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Implementing Privacy Policy: Who 
Should Do What, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1117 (2019). The appearance 
of regulatory terra nova can trigger contests among agencies seeking to stake claims to the 
new terrain. 
 7. Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4 
POL’Y SCI. 155 (1973). 
 8. James C. Grimaldi, Enron Case Attracts Lawyers Like a Flame Attracts Moths, More 
than You Can Shake a Stick at, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2002, at E2 (“There are a handful of 
industries in which both the FTC and Justice Department have expertise. So when a hot 
merger comes up, and the staff of each agency wants a piece of it, the assistant attorney 
general for antitrust and the FTC chairman have to sort it out.”). 
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traditional methodology for allocating matters between the 
agencies has emphasized historical experience in addressing 
specific commercial sectors. As the boundaries that separate 
individual sectors have blurred in the face of rapid technological 
change, and as deregulation measures have allowed firms to 
diversify, this clearance methodology has begun to break down. 
In a growing number of important economic sectors of mutual 
concern to the FTC and the DOJ, the effectiveness of the 
experience-based allocation methodology that has anchored past 
clearance agreements has diminished significantly.9 
The FTC and DOJ sought to resolve this dispute by negotiating 
and publishing a comprehensive statement that described the 
division of labor the two agencies intended to follow with respect 
to specific market sectors, and set out how future disagreements 
would be resolved.10 Although the DOJ ultimately abrogated the 
agreement under pressure from Senator Ernest Hollings, the 
underlying dynamics that gave rise to these problems have not 
changed materially in the intervening years.11 As such, it should not 
come as a surprise that in 2019 the FTC and DOJ negotiated a 
similar agreement focusing on the tech sector. Pursuant to that 
agreement, the FTC agreed to focus on Facebook and Amazon, and 
the DOJ agreed to focus on Google and Apple.12 (The irony of two 
competing competition agencies repeatedly negotiating over how 
best to divide a market does not escape us). 
Roughly two months later, a turf war broke out when the DOJ 
asserted it would be reviewing the behavior of “social media[] and 
some retail services online”—a statement that was “widely 
interpreted by the legal community to mean Facebook and 
Amazon, two companies that under the earlier agreement stood to 
 
 9. Press Release, FTC, FTC and DOJ Announce New Clearance Procedures for 
Antitrust Matters: Memorandum of Agreement Allocates Industry Sectors Between 
Agencies (Mar. 5, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/03/ftc-
and-doj-announce-new-clearance-procedures-antitrust-matters. 
 10. David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who Does What Matters: Governmental 
Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446, 1483 (2014). 
 11. Id.; see also Lauren Kearney Peay, The Cautionary Tale of the Failed 2002 FTC/DOJ 
Merger Clearance Accord, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1307 (2007). 
 12. Brent Kendall & John D. McKinnon, Congress, Enforcement Agencies Target Tech, 
WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2019, 7:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-to-examine-how-
facebook-s-practices-affect-digital-competition-11559576731. 
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have at least some of their conduct reviewed by the FTC.”13 Such 
claim-jumping heightened tensions between the two agencies, 
which were already inflamed by the DOJ’s recent intervention in a 
case the FTC brought against Qualcomm.14 Such disagreements are 
not new: any list would include the dispute in 2008 over the 
appropriate standards for enforcing Section 2 of the Sherman Act,15 
the FTC’s opposition in 2007 to the granting of cert in a private 
antitrust case against Pacific Bell where the DOJ filed an amicus 
brief urging the granting of cert, the DOJ’s 2005 opposition to the 
 
 13. John D. McKinnon & James V. Grimal, Justice Department, FTC Skirmish Over 
Antitrust Turf: Concerns Grow that Tussle Could Disrupt Coming Probes into Big Tech Companies, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2019, 5:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-ftc-
skirmish-over-antitrust-turf-11564997402; see also Brent Kendall, Senators Question Two 
Agencies’ Investigation of Big Tech Firms, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17, 2019, 6:01 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/senator-questions-two-agencies-investigations-of-big-tech-
firms-11568750084 (“On Big Tech, lawmakers cited evidence that the two agencies aren’t 
getting along and questioned whether turf wars are interfering with the government’s ability 
to tackle pressing issues . . . .”). 
 14. McKinnon & Grimal, supra note 13; see also Asa Fitch, Justice Department Warns 
Against Broad Penalty for Qualcomm in FTC Case, WALL ST. J. (May 3, 2019, 2:30 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-warns-against-broad-penalty-for-
qualcomm-in-ftc-case-11556865004; Timothy Syrett, The FTC’s Qualcomm Case Reveals 
Concerning Divide with DOJ on Patent Hold-Up, IP WATCHDOG (June 28, 2019), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/06/28/ftcs-qualcomm-case-reveals-concerning-
divide-doj-patent-hold/id=110764/ (“The public feuding between the two federal antitrust 
enforcement agencies about how to resolve a case litigated by one [of] them was a remarkable 
spectacle. It also brought into focus a broader divide between the FTC and DOJ on the role 
of antitrust law in addressing patents that are essential to industry standards (SEPs) and 
subject to commitments to license on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) 
terms.”). 
For those who are unfamiliar with the facts, in 2017 a divided FTC issued a complaint 
attacking Qualcomm’s patent licensing practices. In 2019, the district court found that 
Qualcomm had engaged in illegal monopolization and enjoined the company from 
continuing the challenged conduct. Toward the close of the district court proceedings, DOJ 
filed an “expression of interest” in the case and cautioned the trial judge to avoid the 
imposition of severe remedies. Following the district court’s decision, DOJ successfully 
petitioned the Ninth Circuit to stay the implementation of a number of the district court’s 
remedies. 
In its filings, DOJ urged the court of appeals to vacate the lower court’s decision, assailed the 
FTC’s theory of the case and the district judge’s application of the law, and enlisted the 
Departments of Defense and Energy to bolster its arguments. Shara Tibken, DOJ: Antitrust 
Ruling Against Qualcomm Could ‘Put Our Nation’s Security at Risk, CNET (July 16, 2019, 5:01 
PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/doj-says-antitrust-ruling-against-qualcomm-could-
put-our-nations-security-at-risk/. For various filings relating to the FTC’s case against 
Qualcomm, see Qualcomm Inc., Fed. Trade Commission (July 19, 2019), 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/141-0199/qualcomm-inc. 
 15. Competition Over the Antitrust Laws: DOJ and FTC Part Ways in the Supreme Court, 
MAYER BROWN (Oct. 17, 2008), https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-
events/publications/2008/10/competition-over-the-antitrust-laws-doj-and-ftc-pa. 
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granting of cert in the FTC’s case against Schering-Plough, and the 
DOJ’s refusal to represent the FTC before the Supreme Court in 
Indiana Federation of Dentists—prompting the FTC to pursue the 
case itself.16 
B. Privacy Law 
Privacy law presents another useful case study of polycentrism 
at the federal level, with some (but by no means all) of the ground 
rules set by Congressional action. The most important federal 
privacy institution is the FTC.17 Congress authorized the FTC to 
pursue a privacy mandate in certain specified areas, but the FTC 
has built a more extensive “common law” of privacy protection 
using cases brought pursuant to its statutory mandate to pursue 
“unfair or deceptive acts and practices.”18 The FTC has also used its 
rulemaking authority to build important elements of the national 
privacy architecture, including the Do-Not-Call rule.19 
But primacy does not mean monopoly. The FTC Act largely 
exempts banks, common carriers, and not-for-profit institutions 
from the FTC’s oversight.20 Various sectoral regulators occupy 
much of this policy terrain. For example, the Federal Commun-
ications Commission (FCC) exercises privacy oversight for 
telecommunications providers—with the boundary between what 
is (and is not) a telecommunications service moving in response to 
technological change, court decisions, and the FCC’s own actions.21 
Similarly, the Department of Education enforces the Family 
 
 16. James C. Miller III, Causes and Implications of the Regulatory Revolution at the FTC, in 
THE REGULATORY REVOLUTION AT THE FTC: A THIRTY YEAR PERSPECTIVE ON COMPETITION 
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 1, 7 (James Cooper ed., 2013). 
 17. See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 
192 (“The Federal Trade Commission has emerged as the nation’s top regulator of online 
privacy.”); Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data 
Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2267 (2015) (“In the current U.S. privacy regulatory 
system, the FTC has grown into the role of being the leading regulator of privacy . . . .”); 
David C. Vladeck, Charting the Course: The Federal Trade Commission’s Second Hundred Years, 
83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2101, 2102–11 (2015). 
 18. David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Implementing Privacy Policy: Who Should 
Do What?, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1117, 1119–49 (2019). 
 19. Id. at 1131–32. 
 20. These jurisdictional limitations are described in ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS  
658–59 (Jonathan I. Gleklen et al. eds., 7th ed. 2012). 
 21. See Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has Software, 84 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672, 1674–75, 1697–98 (2016). 
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Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), which imposes 
record-disclosure duties and limits on educational institutions and 
state educational bodies that receive federal funds. The Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) plays the lead role in 
enforcement of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (“HIPAA”), which established data privacy obligations and 
security requirements to safeguard medical information. Then 
there is the DOJ, which is responsible for enforcing a collection of 
criminal statutes which can be used to attack privacy-related 
cybercrimes. 
So far, we have focused on consumer-facing privacy—but of 
course, multiple federal departments, agencies, and bureaus collect 
and maintain information that implicates privacy concerns. The 
good news is that many of these public entities have their own 
privacy offices.22 The bad news is that each of them is largely free 
to set their own privacy policies and make their own trade-offs. 
As with competition law, there have been periodic disputes 
among the regulatory agencies that occupy this policy space. 
Consider the issue of how much privacy protection medical records 
should have—and whether and when those privacy-related 
interests should give way in the context of law enforcement 
investigations. In an oral history interview conducted in 2007, 
former HHS Secretary Donna Shalala explained that when the 
HIPAA regulations were being drafted, HHS personnel prioritized 
medical privacy while DOJ personnel prioritized law enforcement 
interests: 
On the privacy regulations, Janet Reno stopped me from—she 
wanted any sheriff to be able to rifle through anyone’s health 
records without a court order. I thought that was a terrible idea. I 
lost it. We had a change in the chief of staff. Her deputy left who 
was hot to trot on this issue. I went back in and argued the issue 
and won it. Sticking around for eight years made a difference.23 
 
 22. See, e.g., Privacy, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/ 
topic/privacy (last visited Nov. 3, 2019); Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/opcl (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). In addition, HHS, the 
Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development all 
have privacy offices as well. 
 23. Donna Shalala Oral History, MILLER CTR. (May 15, 2007), 
https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/donna-shalala-oral-
history-secretary-health-and-human. 
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But in Washington, in the words of former Secretary of State George 
Schultz, “it’s never over.”24  Secretary Shalala’s victory may turn 
out to be substantially undone if a recent notice of proposed 
rulemaking issued by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration (SAMHSA) is any indication.25 
The FTC and FCC have also tussled over the best approach to 
consumer privacy for internet service providers,26 and the FTC and 
the Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) have waged a behind-
the-scenes campaign over which agency has the better framework 
for advocating privacy when the United States is dealing with 
foreign nations.27 
As these examples illustrate, when it comes to privacy, different 
agencies within the federal administrative state can have very 
different interests, priorities, and goals. There is a Federal Privacy 
Council, which is intended to support inter-agency coordination of 
privacy protection.28 But the existence of the Privacy Council does 
not mean that coordination across agencies will result. Some 
disputes, like the one over law enforcement access to medical 
records, involve claims where it is difficult or impossible to split the 
baby. Finally, even when an agency has a long and distinguished 
history of protecting privacy, the “felt necessities of the time” may 
cause that agency to reverse course and then bury the evidence—
 
 24. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY 
THEY DO IT 300 (1989). 
 25. Alison Knopf, SAMHSA Ushers in Law Enforcement “Fishing Expeditions” for MAT 
Patients, FILTER MAG. (Aug. 28, 2019), https://filtermag.org/samhsa-law-enforcement-mat/ 
(discussing SAMHSA proposal that would allow investigation of one suspect to permit the 
seizure of records of any other connected individuals or entities). 
 26. Amir Nasr, Roles of FTC, FCC Are Front and Center in Privacy Debate, MORNING 
CONSULT (Sep. 27, 2016, 7:11 PM), https://morningconsult.com/2016/09/27/roles-ftc-fcc-
front-center-privacy-debate/. 
 27. Compare FTC Staff Issues Privacy Report, Offers Framework for Consumers, Businesses, 
and Policymakers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/ 
2010/12/privacyreport.shtm; Commerce Department Unveils Policy Framework for Protecting 
Consumer Privacy Online While Supporting Innovation, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 
16, 2010), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2010/commerce-department-unveils-
policy-framework-protecting-consumer-privacy-online-w. 
 28. Purpose and Vision, FED. PRIVACY COUNCIL, https://www.fpc.gov/federal-
privacy-council/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2019). 
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as was the case with the Census Bureau’s release of information on 
Japanese-Americans during World War II.29 
C. Salmon 
In the 2011 State of the Union Address, President Barack Obama 
spoke of the importance of reorganizing government to make it 
work better: 
We live and do business in the Information Age, but the last major 
reorganization of the government happened in the age of black-
and-white TV. There are twelve different agencies that deal with 
exports. There are at least five different agencies that deal with 
housing policy. Then there’s my favorite example: The Interior 
Department is in charge of salmon while they’re in fresh water, 
but the Commerce Department handles them when they’re in 
saltwater. I hear it gets even more complicated once they’re 
smoked.30 
The joke about smoked salmon was the biggest laugh line of the 
2011 State of the Union Address.31 The accompanying infographic, 
reproduced below as Figure 1, also indicates that the problem of 
regulatory authority over salmon is not to be taken seriously, and 










 29. Teresa Watanabe, In 1943, Census Released Japanese Americans’ Data, L.A. TIMES 
(Mar. 31, 2007 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-mar-31-na-
census31-story.html; OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (Belknap Press of 
Harvard Univ. Press 2009) (1881) (“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, 
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share 
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining 
the rules by which men should be governed.”). 
 30. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011). 
 31. Admittedly, there typically isn’t much competition for the title of “biggest laugh 
line in the State of the Union Address.” 
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Figure 1: Allocation of Regulatory Responsibility for Salmon32 
 
But, salmon (whether in fresh water, saltwater, or smoked) 
actually exemplify the ways in which regulatory authority within 
the federal administrative state is polycentric, as well as the role of 
historical accident in creating that outcome. For starters, President 
Obama is correct that regulatory authority over saltwater salmon is 
in Commerce—but the only reason the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is in Commerce is because 
of President Nixon’s personal pique at the then-Secretary of the 
Department of the Interior (which was the leading candidate for 
housing NOAA when it was created).33 Similarly, although 
regulatory authority for fresh-water salmon primarily resides in the 
 
          32. 2011 Enhanced State of the Union Address Graphics, SLIDESHARE (Jan. 26, 2011) (slide 
54), https://www.slideshare.net/whitehouse/2011-enhanced-state-of-the-union-address-
graphics. 
 33. See Steven Eli Schanes, The Battle for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) 1969-71, SCHANES (May 21, 2008, 8:11 PM), 
http://schanes.wordpress.com/2008/05/21/the-battle-for-the-national-oceanic-and-
atmospheric-administration-noaa/; see also Steven Eli Schanes, Putting NOAA Together- 1970, 
SCHANES (May 24, 2008, 7:56 PM), http://schanes.wordpress.com/2008/05/24/putting-
noaa-together-1970/; Eileen L. Shea, A History of NOAA, NOAA HISTORY 
http://www.history.noaa.gov/legacy/noaahistory_1.html (last updated June 8, 2006, 9:24 
AM). 
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Department of the Interior (“Interior”), there are actually four 
autonomous units within Interior that have some degree of 
responsibility: the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Bureau of 
Reclamation. Plus, there’s the Department of Defense (Army Corps 
of Engineers), the Department of Energy (Bonneville Power 
Administration), Commerce (the National Marine Fisheries 
Service), and two autonomous units within the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA): the U.S. Forest Service and the Agricultural 
Marketing Service. Fish that are caught and destined to be smoked 
fall within the jurisdiction of the NOAA and the Department of 
Health & Human Services (Food and Drug Administration). 
Finally, the Environmental Protection Agency is involved, both 
while the fish are alive in the wild (in connection with the 
Endangered Species Act) and after they are caught (in connection 
with the packaging materials used on smoked and raw fish). 
Even if we focus on a more limited setting (say salmon that are, 
or might one day, be swimming in the Columbia River Basin), the 
number of federal entities that are involved is still quite impressive. 
A 2002 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report counted 
fully eleven federal agencies: The Department of Commerce’s 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) 
is responsible for preparing a recovery plan and consulting with 
other federal agencies to determine whether the agencies’ 
planned actions will jeopardize listed salmon and steelhead 
populations. In addition to NMFS, the federal agencies involved 
in the recovery effort include the following: 
• The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of 
Reclamation, which operate the Columbia River Basin dams that 
salmon and steelhead must pass, and the Bonneville Power 
Administration, which markets the electric power created by 
water flowing through the dams’ turbines. 
• The U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service manage natural resources, which 
include habitat for salmon and steelhead, for multiple purposes, 
such as timber, grazing, fish, wildlife, and recreation. 
• The Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Geological Survey, 
Natural Resources Conservation Service, and Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, which carry out various actions, such as setting water 
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quality standards, performing research, working with 
landowners, and protecting tribal fishing rights, all of which, 
directly affect salmon and steelhead populations.34 
Unsurprisingly, the welter of federal entities with an interest in 
salmon has caused disputes.35 These disputes have broken down 
along entirely predictable lines: the parts of the federal government 
that care about outdoor recreation and threatened/endangered 
species sided with the salmon, while the parts of the federal 
government that care about dams, electrical power, and water for 
agriculture were unconcerned about the plight of the salmon. 
Consider the framing of the lawsuit that Oregon and a number of 
private individuals and organizations brought against the federal 
government: 
Oregon wanted the federal agencies th[at] manage the flow of the 
Columbia and Snake Rivers. . . to spill more water over dams in 
order to improve young salmon’s [sic] odds of survival. Oregon 
was supported by . . . some federal agencies sympathetic to more 
salmon protection (the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National 
Park Service). Unified against the suit were other, more 
prominent agencies of the U.S. government (the Army Corps of 
Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, and Bonneville Power 
Administration or BPA). . . .36 
That particular lawsuit dragged on for more than twenty years, 
with multiple trips to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.37 The case 
 
 34. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 02-612, COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN SALMON 
AND STEELHEAD: FEDERAL AGENCIES’ RECOVERY RESPONSIBILITIES, EXPENDITURES AND 
ACTIONS 2 (2002), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02612.pdf. 
 35. In fairness, there are many additional disputes involving various combinations of 
individuals, states, native tribes, Canada, and Japan. 
 36. Ctr. for the Study of the Pac. Nw., Univ. of Wash., Lesson Two: To Whom Does the 
Pacific Northwest Belong?, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, https://www.washington.edu/ 
uwired/outreach/cspn/Website/Classroom%20Materials/Pacific%20Northwest%20Histo
ry/Lessons/Lesson%202/2.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
 37. BILL CRAMPTON & BARRY ESPENSON, COLUMBIA BASIN BULLETIN, AN ACCOUNT OF 
LITIGATION OVER FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM BIOLOGICAL OPINIONS FOR 
SALMON AND STEELHEAD, 1991–2009 6 (1st ed. 2019); see also The Oregonian, Timeline, Major 
Players in the Northwest Salmon Lawsuit in the Columbia River Basin, 
https://www.oregonlive.com/environment/2011/05/timeline_major_players_in_the.html 
(last updated Jan. 10, 2019). 
002.HYMAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/25/20  11:24 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
1460 
 
went on so long that the district court judge who first handled it 
(Malcolm Marsh) became known as the “salmon judge.”38 
Finally, although we focused in this section on salmon, 
environmental matters present multiple instances of different parts 
of the federal government being on opposite sides of the issue.39 
D. Jurisdictional Chaos: Its Everywhere You Look 
As these three case studies suggest, one can find overlapping 
regulatory authority and inter-agency conflict everywhere one 
looks in the federal government.40 For those who think we have 
cherry-picked a few unrepresentative examples, we highlight the 
findings of several official government reports drawn from the last 
four decades. First up is a 2011 report from the GAO. Table 1 in that 
report made it clear that there were multiple examples of 
duplication, overlap and fragmentation, including fifteen different 
agencies overseeing food-safety laws; more than twenty separate 
 
 38. Kelly A. Zusman, Judicial Profile Hon. Malcom F. Marsh US District Judge, District of 
Oregon, FED. BAR ASS’N (July 2004), http://www.fedbar.org/PDFs/Past-Judicial-
Profiles/Ninth-Circuit_1/Marsh-Hon-Malcolm.aspx; US DISTRICT COURT OF OREGON 
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, MALCOLM MARSH: AN ORAL HISTORY, at ix (Donna Sinclair, ed.) (2007) 
https://usdchs.files.wordpress.com/2016/05/malcolm-marsh-usdchs-oral-history.pdf. 
 39. See FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION: A POLICY AND MANAGEMENT 
PERSPECTIVE 118 (2008) (“Senator Frank Moss ascribed the conflict between the National Park 
Service and the Army Corps of Engineers over the Florida Everglades to ‘uncoordinated 
activities.’ Park service officials complained that the engineers drained the Everglades 
National Park almost dry in their efforts to halt wetlands flooding and reclaim glad country 
for agriculture. The Army Corps of Engineers argued that wetlands were ‘for the birds’ and 
flood control for the people.”). In U.S. v. Mast, Mast found himself criminally prosecuted for 
draining wetlands, even though the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (part of the Department of 
the Interior) and the U.S Natural Resources Conservation Service (part of the Department of 
Agriculture) disagreed on whether his actions were permissible or not. 938 F.3d 973, 974 (8th 
Cir. 2019). See also Lyndsey Layton, Pentagon Fights EPA on Pollution Cleanup, WASH. POST 
(June 30, 2008) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/29/ 
AR2008062901977.html (“Although the law gives final say to EPA Administrator Stephen L. 
Johnson in cleanup disputes with other federal agencies, the Pentagon refuses to recognize 
that provision. Military officials wrote to the Justice Department last month to challenge 
EPA’s authority to issue the orders and asked the Office of Management and Budget to 
intervene.”); Elana Schor, Canada-U.S. Oil Pipeline Poses Few Environmental Risks—State Dept., 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2011) http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/08/26/26greenwire-
canada-us-oil-pipeline-poses-few-environmental-63932.html (noting disagreement between 
Department of State and EPA over approval of Keystone pipeline, and the completeness of 
the Environmental Impact Statement that was completed). 
 40. See Bijal Shah, Executive (Agency) Administration, 72 STAN. L. REV. 641 (2020) 
(identifying multiple instances of conflict between executive agencies and administrative 
agencies that played out in legal proceedings). 
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programs (spread across seven federal agencies) to help the 
homeless; eighty programs for economic development (spread 
across four federal agencies); eighty-two programs to improve 
teacher quality (spread across ten federal agencies); eighty 
programs to help disadvantaged people with transportation 
(spread across 8 federal agencies); forty-four programs for job 
training and employment (spread across three agencies); and fifty-
six programs spread across twenty agencies intended to improve 
financial literacy.41 
That report spawned a series of annual reports, the most recent 
of which was issued in May 2019.42 All nine of these reports 
documented multiple examples of duplication, overlap, and failed 
coordination. 
Next, there is the 2003 Volcker commission report on 
government organization: 
Prior to the post 9/11 reorganizations, over 40 federal agencies 
were involved in activities to combat terrorism. The Department 
of Housing and Urban Development operates 23 self-sufficiency 
and economic opportunity programs that target tenants of public 
housing and other low-income clients. Responsibility for federal 
drug control strategies and their implementation is fragmented 
among more than fifty federal agencies. There are over 90 early 
childhood programs scattered among 11 federal agencies and 20 
offices. Nine federal agencies administer 69 programs supporting 
education and care for children under age five. There are 342 
federal economic development related programs administered by 
13 of the 14 cabinet departments. Seven agencies administer 40 
different programs that have job training as their main purpose. 
At least 86 teacher-training programs in nine federal agencies 
fund similar types of services. Four agencies are responsible for 
federal land management. . . There are 50 homeless assistance 
programs administered by eight agencies . . . . 29 agencies 
collectively share responsibility for federal clean air, clean and 
safe water, and better waste management programs . . . . these 
 
 41. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-318SP, OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE 
POTENTIAL DUPLICATION IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, SAVE TAX DOLLARS, AND ENHANCE 
REVENUE (2011). 
 42. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-285SP, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT: 
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE FRAGMENTATION, OVERLAP, AND DUPLICATION AND 
ACHIEVE BILLIONS IN FINANCIAL BENEFITS (2019). 
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divided responsibilities have produced 541 separate areas of 
program activity.43 
Twenty-six years earlier, when President Carter announced a 
comprehensive study of reorganization in 1977, he provided 
similar examples of duplication and inefficiency.44 
We close with an example that should have particular 
resonance for the citizens of Utah. Utah contains physically 
contiguous National Parks, National Monuments, and National 
Forests—all within easy driving distance of Provo. But the National 
Parks and National Monuments are under the authority and 
jurisdiction of Interior, while the National Forests are under the 
authority and jurisdiction of USDA—with profound differences in 
how the land in question is managed and the culture of the 
responsible agencies. Since the lands in question are physically 
adjoining, decisions made by the National Park Service will have 
spillover effects on the land regulated by the U.S. Forest Service, 
and vice-versa. 
Of course, this dynamic isn’t limited to Utah: the fifteen million 
acres of federal land surrounding and including Yellowstone 
National Park “are managed by four federal agencies, the National 
Park Service, the U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service and the Bureau of Land Management, each with differing 
missions and organizational structures.”45 And there are more than 
a dozen national forests that adjoin national parks.46 The history of 
the National Forest Service is replete with examples of its attempts 
 
 43. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE PUB. SERV., URGENT BUSINESS FOR AMERICA: REVITALIZING 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 36–37 (2003) [hereinafter “Volcker 
Commission”], https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/01governance. 
pdf. 
 44. The Am. Presidency Project, Jimmy Carter: Executive Branch Reorganization Studies 
Remarks to Reporters Announcing the Studies, UC SANTA BARBARA, http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/node/244146 (last visited Oct. 4, 2019). 
 45. About, GREATER YELLOWSTONE COORDINATING COMMITTEE, 
https://www.fedgycc.org/about. 
 46. Hannah Featherman, Sixteen National Forests Near National Parks, NATIONAL 
FOREST FOUNDATION (Jun. 17, 2013), https://www.nationalforests.org/blog/sixteen-
national-forests-near-national-parks. The specific states are Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Montana, North Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
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to manage this and other situations that call for coordination with 
other branches of the federal government.47 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERALISM 
A. Cooperation, Rivalry, and Conflict Within the Federal Government 
As Section II and our prior work make clear, the division of 
regulatory “ownership” can result in cooperation, but it can also 
result in rivalry and conflict.48 Agencies do not always agree on 
whether there is a problem that needs fixing.49 Even when agencies 
agree on the nature and seriousness of the problem, they can have 
profound disagreements on the optimal solution, the best way to 
achieve that outcome, and which of the rival agencies is best 
situated to implement that solution. These disputes are often driven 
by differences among agencies in tradition, culture, and ways of 
looking at the world. 
The two quotes with which we begin this Article exemplify the 
ways in which we observe such patterns of conflict across different 
branches of the military. A naïve observer might hope that such 
problems are easily solvable within a single Department (like the 
Department of Defense, or “DoD”), but difficult to solve across 
Departments and independent agencies. Unfortunately, the 
problem is sticky (if not intractable) even in the presence of strong 
leadership exercised within a single Department. Once again, as the 
two quotes that begin this Article exemplify, there are fundamental 
persistent rivalries within individual branches of the military.50 
Even the children of military personnel are rapidly socialized into 
the tribal nature of the individual services.51 Further evidence on 
 
 47. See, e.g., ROBERT D. BAKER, ROBERT S. MAXWELL, VICTOR H. TREAT & HENRY C. 
DETHLOFF, TIMELESS HERITAGE: A HISTORY OF THE FOREST SERVICE IN THE SOUTHWEST (1988), 
http://npshistory.com/publications/usfs/region/3/history/. Chapter 14 is devoted to 
“Relations with Other Federal and State Agencies.” 
 48. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 10, at 1497. 
 49. The brawl between the FTC and the DOJ over Qualcomm exemplifies this 
possibility. See supra note 14. 
 50. See supra note 14 
 51. MARY ELLEN WERTSCH, MILITARY BRATS: LEGACIES OF CHILDHOOD INSIDE THE 
FORTRESS 311–12 (2006) (“When I was a small child, I understood that we were something 
called an ‘Army family,’ although I had only a vague idea of what that meant. But I knew 
one thing for certain: We were most definitely not Navy. . . . One Army colonel’s daughter 
told me her father refused to attend her wedding because she was marrying a Navy brat.”). 
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this point is provided by the continuing debates over whether 
military commands should be regional or functional, and where to 
place the United States Space Force inside DoD.52 
What are the implications of our findings for federalism? To the 
extent there are differences of opinion within the polycentric 
federal administrative state on an issue that raises issues of 
federalism, the case for deference to the approach preferred by the 
federal government (let alone preemption) is much weaker. After 
all, if the federal government can’t speak with one voice or one 
mind on the issue, why should the states lose to an internally 
divided federal government in federalism cases?53 A hard-nosed 
approach to this problem will create a substantial incentive for the 
federal government to do a better job of getting its act together (in 
every sense of those words) and take the necessary steps to fix the 
organizational structure of the federal administrative state. 
B. Engineering, Not Physics in Managing Federalism 
During three years of private practice in the 1980s, one of us 
(Kovacic) worked extensively with engineers in companies that had 
participated in the U.S. space program in the 1960s. In a number of 
conversations, the engineers recounted their frustration in listening 
to physicists talk about space travel without addressing the 
practical difficulties associated with sending humans 240,000 miles 
to the moon—and then returning them alive. As Kovacic recalls, 
one engineer observed that “the physics of going to the moon was 
relatively straightforward—but the engineering was really dif-
 
 52. Sandra Erwin, Defense Officials: New Military Branch Designed for the ‘Unique 
Culture’ of Space, SPACE NEWS (Mar. 2, 2019), https://spacenews.com/defense-officials-new-
military-branch-designed-for-the-unique-culture-of-space/. 
 53. See also Shah, supra note 40, at note 279 (“We love to hear from the federal 
government. . . but it’s a bit awkward to hear from them on both sides.”); Neal Devins & 
Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. 
CON. L. 558, 573–74 (2003) (“Inconsistency will not only annoy judges, it will eliminate the 
otherwise natural tendency to defer to the government’s presumably well-thought-out 
position. Both in her direct admonitions, and indirectly through the evident importance that 
she attaches to the matter and her somewhat testy tone, Judge Wald makes clear that simply 
as a matter of litigating strategy it is a bad idea for the government to contradict itself.”); cf. 
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018) (“[W]hatever argument might be 
mustered for deferring to the Executive on grounds of political accountability, surely it 
becomes a garble when the Executive speaks from both sides of its mouth, articulating no 
single position on which it might be held accountable.”). 
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ficult.” Brilliant physics without equally brilliant engineering 
would guarantee mission failure. 
Discussions about public policy often reflect an analogous form 
of tunnel vision. Politicians and policymakers (particularly those 
who wish to be thought of as visionary leaders) routinely set out a 
grand vision without thinking hard about the steps needed to 
actually implement that vision in practice. Big policy ideas (the 
physics of public administration) are destined to disappoint, unless 
they are accompanied by skillful implementation (the engineering 
of public administration). 
In the federal-state relationship, the tension between policy 
diversification and policy coherence poses daunting implementa-
tion challenges. But treating the matter as one of engineering 
(rather than of physics) suggests various strategies for moderating 
these challenges. At the outset, we set aside the most dramatic 
solution of vesting sole responsibility in federal agencies, and 
automatic preemption of state efforts and participation. On the 
whole, we believe the benefits of decentralized authority—notably, 
useful policy experimentation and prototyping, the supplemen-
tation of federal resources with state funding, and a critical 
safeguard against simultaneous fifty-state catastrophic failure—
warrants continuation of a significant state role in multiple policy 
domains.54 The politics of these issues are also quite daunting.  
Stated differently, fair-weather federalism is far more common than 
all-weather federalism.55 
 
 54. We address these arguments in Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 6. 
 55. See, e.g., Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chuck Schumer and Elizabeth Warren Are All for 
State Autonomy—When the GOP’s in Charge, USA TODAY (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www. 
usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/04/23/chuck-schumer-elizabeth-warren-marijuana-
federalism-column/540253002/ (“Schumer and Warren’s interest in federalism would be 
welcome if it were general and sincere, but it is limited and insincere.”); Michael Jonas, 
Progressive Politics From the Ground Up, COMMONWEALTH (Jul. 11, 2017), 
https://commonwealthmagazine.org/politics/progressive-politics-from-the-ground-up/ 
(“[B]oth sides are fair-weather federalists. Both sides will, depending on the politics of the 
moment, prefer state or national power, depending on where they’re in control.”) (quoting 
Dean Heather Gerken); Jacob Sullum, Fair-Weather Federalists, REASON (July 2012), 
https://reason.com/2012/06/14/fair-weather-federalists/ (noting selective invocations of 
federalism arguments); Garrett Epps, The Opportunists Friend (and Foe): State’s Rights, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 20, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/20/opinion/the-opportunist-s-
friend-and-foe-states-rights.html (“[W]hen it comes to states’ rights, we are all hypocrites. . . 
One scans American history in vain to find a major figure whose position on states’ rights 
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At the same time, we think there is considerable room to 
achieve greater policy coherence and more effective use of public 
resources through “softer” forms of cooperation. We acknowledge 
that our proposals are neither earth-shattering nor flamboyant—a 
weakness which we believe is more than offset by the reality that 
our modest strategies actually work well in practice, unlike the 
more sweeping solutions that have been floated.56 
Our chief suggestion is to expand the use of opt-in networks to 
join up federal and state regulators. For example, a “Domestic 
Competition Network” would engage federal and state agencies 
with a competition policy mandate in regular consultations about 
matters of common interest.57 For antitrust law and other areas of 
regulatory policy, the program of a network of regulators would 
have several dimensions, including the creation of working groups 
to address various commercial phenomena, identifying allocations 
of agency resources that would maximize the contributions of all 
network participants, engage in common research projects, 
establish interagency guidelines and protocols that clarify substan-
tive standards and procedures, and convene events (e.g., hearings 
and conferences) on topics of common concern. 
To be successful, the networks would need to encourage 
engagement at three levels of agency personnel: top leadership, 
senior division managers, and case-handlers. For the latter group, 
we can imagine a regular program of secondments by which 
agencies exchange personnel to work inside their counterpart 
 
was not directly connected to his or her position on the underlying political question. When 
it suits our leaders, they are in favor of broad federal power; when it does not, they claim 
‘states’ rights.’”) 
For a recent example, see Kendall, supra note 13 (noting opposition by Democrats in Congress 
to a federal antitrust investigation of four automobile companies that “struck a deal with 
California on vehicle-emissions standards”). 
 56. Three rationales justify starting small. First, such measures can make useful 
contributions by themselves. Second, in the aggregate, they can create an environment in 
which bolder approaches might flourish, while simultaneously operating as a test bed for 
developing prototypes for more elaborate programs in the future. And third, small steps 
stand a greater chance of success because their scale is more manageable, and they are less 
likely to trigger push-back than “swinging for the fences.” 
 57. See William E. Kovacic, Toward a Domestic Competition Network, in COMPETITION 
LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 316 (Richard A. 
Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004). 
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institutions.58 This mechanism provides a means for sharing 
knowledge and building the personal relationships and trust that 
facilitate interagency cooperation. The sharing of knowledge is a 
vital objective of the networking initiatives we propose, since it 
accelerates learning and convergence on better practices far quicker 
than would be the case if each institution functioned in isolation. 
Networking can convert a collection of flatter learning curves into 
a single steeper learning curve that enables all participating 
institutions to make progress more quickly. 
Enhanced networking also fits well into a decentralized policy 
environment and stimulates opting-in to better practices. 
Individual institutions would continue to conduct policy experi-
ments, informed by the larger body of experience accumulated by 
all related institutions. Networking would encourage agencies to 
report to each other on the design and implementation of 
individual policy experiments and to devise techniques for 
measuring outcomes. The disclosure of experiment design and 
operations, and the evaluation of results would inform judgments 
by each policymaker about whether to emulate the policy technique 
in question. 
Of course, creating and nurturing these networks involves 
answering a host of practical questions, virtually all of which lie 
beyond the scope of this paper. For those who are skeptical of the 
utility of opt-in networks to improve policymaking, we note that 
we are not writing on a blank slate. As part of the modernization of 
their competition regime in 2004, the European Union established 
a European Competition Network that joins up the EU Member 
State competition authorities in regular discussions, along with the 
 
 58. To be sure, secondments are not a magical solution to rivalry and cultural conflict. 
See John Diamond, CIA & FBI in the Hot Seat; Officials Seek ‘Smoking Gun’ as Agencies Trade 
Volleys in Sept. 11 Blame Game, USA TODAY, June 4, 2002, at A10 (noting that after the CIA 
and FBI announced that analysts from each agency would be detailed to the other in order 
to break down these barriers, personnel at both agencies called it a “hostage exchange 
program”). Attitudes toward the secondment were understandably negative: “One of the 
FBI agents tapped to participate in the program turned down the assignment and went to 
the CIA only after he was ordered to report there. ‘A detail assignment [to the CIA] was like 
death,’ he recalled. ‘I thought, “I don’t know these people. I don’t like these people. I don’t 
trust these people.”‘“ AMY B. ZEGART, SPYING BLIND: THE CIA, THE FBI, AND THE ORIGINS OF 
9/11 , at 79 (2007). 
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Competition Directorate of the European Commission.59 Similarly, 
when the United Kingdom reformed its competition system in 
2014, it formed a competition network that engages the Competition 
and Markets Authority (the national competition agency) in regular 
discussions with sectoral regulators (such as OFCOM, the telecom-
munications regulator) with a competition mandate.60 A third 
example is the Common Ground Conferences that the FTC and 
various state attorneys general have convened to address specific 
policy issues.61 All of these networks have proven valuable in 
improving the performance of the overall regulatory system while 
preserving opportunities for individual experimentation. 
Of course, forming new institutional frameworks does not 
guarantee that the potential benefits (enhanced policy coordi-
nation) will be realized in practice, let alone maximized. For 
networks to work well, top agency leadership must visibly commit 
time and effort to building and maintaining relationships with their 
counterparts across regulatory entities. Effectiveness also depends 
on the willingness of senior leadership to operate collegially with 
their agency peers and to see value in the development of enhanced 
interagency collaboration. The success achieved by the three 
networks highlighted previously shows that networking initiatives 
can be done and done well. 
Over time, soft convergence mechanisms embodied in network-
ing can provide a basis for developing more formal binding policy 
instruments. The confidence and experience gained by networked 
cooperation can inform judgments about statutory reform regarding 
substantive standards and procedures, with convergence on better, 
if not necessarily best, practices. Stated differently, our modest 
proposal can be an important step toward bolder forms of policy 
convergence. 
 
 59. European Competition Network, EUROPEAN COMMISSION—COMPETITION, https:// 
ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
 60. UK Competition Network, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/ 
uk-competition-network (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
 61. See, e.g., Working Together to Protect Midwest Consumers: A Common Ground 
Conference, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Sep. 19, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/events-calendar/working-together-protect-midwest-consumers-common-ground-
conference. 
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C. Reasons for Optimism 
To say that our proposals are “modest” is not to say that they 
are easy to execute. But all is not lost. Even though the federal 
administrative state is polycentric, usually different agencies can 
get on the same page—or at least in the same ballpark. And federal 
and state authorities seem to be able to figure out how to get along 
much of the time, with some jousting at the margins to ensure each 
side respects the other’s turf. 
In practice, these temporary détentes paper over the dispute 
long enough for us to resolve most of the issues that are the bread 
and butter of federalism scholars. And, the proposals we outline in 
Part III.B may help deal with an appreciable number of the 
remainder. However, for those issues where there is persistent 
divergence within the federal administrative state, we think it is 
time to say “enough already” in handling that subset of federalism 
cases. 
As the Volcker Commission noted, “[t]hose who enter public 
service often find themselves at sea in an archipelago of agencies 
and departments that have grown without logical structure, 
deterring intelligent policymaking. The organization and 
operations of the federal government are a mixture of the outdated, 
the outmoded and the outworn.”62  Given this dynamic, it is 
remarkable that our polycentric federal administrative state 
operates as well as it does. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There are good reasons why we keep fighting about federalism. 
Like all wicked problems, disputes over federalism surface 
fundamental disagreements about priorities and goals. 
Technological development changes the facts on the ground—and 
often prompts reexamination of old compromises and upend the 
(once stable, but now fragile) coalitions that supported those 
solutions. That is why wicked problems resist permanent solutions. 
But, our ongoing debates over federalism also offer an opportunity 
and a focal point for improving the performance of the federal 
 
 62. Volcker Commission, supra note 43, at 1. 
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administrative state, and coordination between the state and 
federal governments. We can do better. We should start doing so. 
 
